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Conflict-induced migration is arguably the most urgent humanitarian challenge today. A growing number of
people are forced from their homes each year. The dispossession of civilians by armed parties, furthermore, through
forced displacement has become a prevalent phenomenon. This article seeks to provide clarity to civilians,
humanitarians, and other stakeholders, attempting to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced displacement through
the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). While IHL prohibits forced displacement, pillage, and illegal
appropriation, a number of problems arise when we try to implement these laws in practice. Establishing the
illegality of an act of forced displacement, for example, may require legal analysis on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, whether appropriation by force due to military necessity is legal or illegal is unclear due to a
divergence between IHL treaty provisions and customary international humanitarian law (CIHL). In addition, when
forced displacement becomes illegal, appropriation or pillage is not defined. This paper views these problems from
a Humanitarian Protection perspective. The objective of the article is to provide practical criteria for stakeholders
aiming to apply the law in protection of civilians and their property.
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It will suffice to mention that millions of human
beings were torn from their homes, separated from
their families (…) among whom there were a great
many women, children, old people and sick, (…)
thankfulness for the prohibition embodied in this
paragraph, which is intended to forbid such hateful
practices for all time (ICRC 1958 Commentaries
Art 49) (GC VI 1949).
The objective of this paper is to define international
humanitarian law (IHL) which can be applied to reduce
civilian vulnerability to forced displacement and illegal
appropriation or pillage through displacement. The paper
will, therefore, clarify the illegality of forced displacementCorrespondence: kerrinbuck@gmail.com
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifand identify when forced displacement becomes illegal
appropriation or pillage, under IHL. The paper will
achieve this through a research analysis which culminates
in legal findings. Finally, a number of recommendations
will be made for the application of these legal findings by
humanitarians and other stakeholders to reduce civilian
vulnerability to forced displacement and illegal appropri-
ation through displacement.
The paper includes analysis of the international crim-
inal and humanitarian law (ICHL) research of the El
Rosario International Law Clinic carried out for the
International Criminal Courts’ (ICCs’)—Office of Public
Council for Victims (OPCV). The research of the
concerns, the “ordering” of forced displacement (Olá-
solo et al. 2016). This research is central to the find-
ings of the paper and provides the legal criteria that
those responsible for forced displacement during con-
flict are obligated to fulfil.is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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content and objectives of this paper. The following
sections of this introduction will provide a more in-depth
synopsis of the article.
The practical application of law from a humanitarian
perspective
The subject of this article is the law; however, it is writ-
ten not from a legal perspective but from a humanitarian
perspective. The following section will, therefore, differ-
entiate between a legal perspective and humanitarian
perspective on IHL.
Architects through practical application of laws, stan-
dards, and regulations design and manage the construc-
tion of secure safe buildings for people. Humanitarians
endeavour through principles, laws, standards, and regu-
lations to provide assistance and protection to people in
need, during disaster, emergency, and conflict.
This study concerns the practical application of the
law in achieving an objective, not in establishing guilt or
innocence ex post facto. This is important to understand,
as for example, a judge, by consulting specific legal pro-
visions and applying the law ex post facto, may be able
to rule that an architect did not construct a building le-
gally. The same judge may have great difficulty, however,
applying those same architectural regulations and laws
to build a safe and secure building. A judge, further-
more, may not be considered qualified to do so. Pre-
mised on this logic, we can infer therefore, that an
architect is responsible for the application of the law
during construction. In practical terms, architects are
the professional incumbents of the laws that govern con-
struction. They hold, in effect, an office responsible for
ensuring that a building is constructed in accordance
with the law.
Equivalently, humanitarians are the professional in-
cumbents of the laws that regulate the protection and
assistance of people during conflict and emergency.
Again, a judge may establish if an act during conflict or
disaster was illegal ex post facto, by referencing legal
provisions and providing evidence of their violation.
There may be a defence and a prosecution furthermore,
neither of whom have the professional responsibility of
providing protection and assistance to people during hu-
manitarian crisis. Conversely, however, humanitarians
have the responsibility for the practical application of
the law, in pursuit of the objective of providing protec-
tion to people during conflict and emergency.
Therefore, while architects and humanitarians are not
responsible for the enforcement of the law, they have
the professional capacity to establish when laws are not
being adhered to and to take action accordingly. In the
case of an architect, this may mean halting construction,
until a contractor meets the regulatory structuralstandards set by an engineer or assisting a client to take
legal action against a contractor. In the case of a
humanitarian, this may mean temporarily suspending
operations, if parties are diverting aid, and denying
access to vulnerable populations.
An architect, in addition, can be consulted to explain
what the consequences might be of an illegally con-
structed building having inadequate foundations, e.g. the
entire building collapses crushing its residents. A hu-
manitarian might be consulted to explain, what would
happen if conflict parties engage in crimes against
humanity, such as the widespread and systematic illegal
appropriation of civilian property through forced
displacement, e.g. collapse of the economy, failure of
agricultural production, mass displacement, famine, and
humanitarian crisis.
This section has differentiated between the enforce-
ment of the law from a legal perspective and the
practical application of the law from a humanitarian per-
spective, introducing, thereby, how this article concerns
the practical application of the law in the present during
conflict and emergency.
The legality of forced displacement from a humanitarian
perspective
The subsequent part of this introduction summarizes
why a humanitarian perspective on IHL is required if
civilian vulnerability to forced displacement and illegal
appropriation through forced displacement is to be re-
duced. Furthermore, the section presents the argument
that the current perspective on IHL may even increase
vulnerability to forced displacement and illegal appropri-
ation and provides only limited protection to civilians
and their housing, land and property (HLP).
This research analysis will bring to light that differenti-
ating between a legal and a humanitarian perspective is
vital, if we hope to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced
displacement through IHL. Pertinent is that a number of
transitional justice scholars take the position that in
order to establish the criminality of an act of forced dis-
placement, an analysis of the conflict as it was at the
time the displacement took place must be carried out
(Bradley 2013; Andreu-Guzmán 2013; ICTJ Research
Unit 2012). Human rights law scholars such as Cantor
(2012), in addition, contend that due to the exceptions
of ‘imperative military reasons’ or ‘civilian security’, es-
tablishing the illegality of forced displacement must take
place on a case-by-case basis. In contrast, a number of
criminal and international law experts, however, hold
that forced displacement is always a crime and that the
burden of proof that an exception is valid lies with the
accused (Hayashi 2010; Jacques 2012; Olásolo 2013;
Korner 2012; Willms 2009). The former arguments take
the position that forced displacement is not in itself
Buck Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2017) 2:5 Page 3 of 18illegal, and the latter takes the position that forced dis-
placement is illegal unless it can be proven that an
exception of ‘imperative military reasons’ or ‘civilian
security’ applies. These positions are based on a legal ex
post facto analysis and are regrettably of little assistance
to humanitarians attempting to apply the law to reduce
civilian vulnerability in the field. Hayashi (2010 p 130)
brings to light this protection gap by highlighting ‘(…)
the potential use (…) of military necessity not only as an
exception but also as a grounds for excluding criminal
responsibility’.
The immediate problems that this causes for civilians
themselves, humanitarians, or other protection actors,
attempting to apply the law in practice, to reduce civilian
vulnerability to forced displacement, is self-explanatory.
As if the criminality of a particular act can only be ad-
judged after the fact, and there are possible grounds for
excluding criminal responsibility, then how can we deter
perpetration of the act in the present? If there is, more-
over, a current perception that military necessity ex-
cludes forced displacement as a crime, especially in the
current climate of counter-terrorism, legal ambiguity
may even encourage its practice (VDC 2015). It is im-
portant to recognize, furthermore, that it is those re-
sponsible for ‘ordering’ forced displacement, not those at
risk, or those enforcing the law, or even Humanitarians,
who decide if a forced displacement is justified, for
imperative military reasons or civilian security in real
time. A number of scholars recognize the legal obstacles
stakeholders face when attempting to reduce civilian
vulnerability to illegal forced displacement (Zapater 2010;
Andreu-Guzmán 2013 et al).
There is, in addition, the practical question of how we
can prevent HLP from being appropriated illegally, if the
act employed by the perpetrators is justifiable as an
exception. If for example HLP from which civilians have
been displaced is appropriated or occupied, can an act of
forced displacement be considered illegal appropriation
or pillage if an exception applies? In addition, even if a
displacement is clearly illegal and civilian HLP is appro-
priated or occupied, at what point can this act be con-
sidered to have become illegal appropriation or pillage?
Moreover, the difficulties of reclaiming property, or
seeking justice for an act of forced displacement in the
context of transitional justice and peace agreements, further
complicates civilian protection (Andreu-Guzmán 2013;
Sassòli 2010; Paglione 2008; Leaning 2011; Korner 2012).
The objective of this section was to highlight that
while the subject of this paper is the law, it is not aimed
at the legal profession to assist in defining criminality ex
post facto. It is written rather to assist in the practical
application of the law, in real time in the field of
Humanitarian Action. This paper, therefore, is written for
humanitarians, protection actors, civilians themselves, andall other stakeholders, who wish to reduce civilian vulner-
ability to illegal forced displacement and illegal appropri-
ation through displacement.Establishing the illegality of an act of forced displacement
and pillage/illegal appropriation through forced
displacement
The following paragraphs introduce how this article
aims to provide clear IHL criteria that can be applied by
stakeholders to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced
displacement. In addition, the section provides a synop-
sis of a central argument of this paper, which maintains
that all stakeholders can establish, and act, if illegal
forced displacement or illegal appropriation through
displacement takes place.
This paper focuses directly on violations of International
Law in the nexus between forced displacement, pillage,
and illegal appropriation. The objective of this paper is to
clarify when forced displacement is illegal and when it
becomes pillage or illegal appropriation under IHL. A
comparative analysis is carried out of contemporarily
applicable IHL treaties and customary international hu-
manitarian law (CIHL). For the purposes of this study,
CIHL is considered to be encompassed by the ICRC
[1995] studies of CIHL, the case law of the ad hoc tribu-
nals, and the ICC. The objective of the analysis is to pro-
vide stakeholders with clear legal criteria for application to
reduce civilian vulnerability to illegal forced displacement
and illegal appropriation or pillage through displacement.
Currently, the authority to decide if an act of forced
displacement is illegal lies either with a United Nations
(UN) Special Commission, a UN Special Rapporteur, an
agreed or mandated humanitarian organization, or with
a national, international or third party state judiciary
(Bongard and Somer 2011; Schrepfer 2012; UNSC 2004;
ICRC 1958; GC VI 1949; ICID 2004). In addition, the
high contracting parties to conflict can appoint a neutral
third party state, or in certain circumstances a neutral
humanitarian organization such as the ICRC, as pro-
tecting power. Subsequently, the appointed party can
assess if the legal criteria of a forced displacement
has been fulfilled [GC IV Arts 9 & 11 1946; GC IV
Arts 9 & 11 commentaries 1958] (GC VI 1949). In the
event, nonetheless, that a forced displacement is deemed
to be illegal, those responsible must ultimately face crim-
inal justice measures and be proven guilty in a court of
law (Andreu-Guzmán 2013 et al).
This article argues that while most stakeholders
cannot assign guilt or enforce the law they can establish if
a forced displacement is illegal and when forced displace-
ment becomes pillage or illegal appropriation. This paper
takes the position, that ultimately, all stakeholders can
decide if the criteria of a legal forced displacement or
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civilians is being pillaged or illegally appropriated.
Therefore, the objective of this article is, as the pre-
vious paragraphs have summarized, to provide legal
criteria not to establish guilt ex post facto but to be
applied actively in the field to reduce civilian
vulnerability.Ordering forced displacement
The following passages will introduce a central issue of
this article which is the ordering of forced displacement.
To assist protection actors in the field, this paper will
seek to establish, who the individuals are that are re-
sponsible, under international criminal and humanitar-
ian law (ICHL), for ensuring that illegal displacements
do not take place.
A number of binding IHL provisions employ the pas-
sage: ‘Ordering the displacement of the civilian popula-
tion (…)’. On closer examination, however, exactly what
is implied by the term ‘ordering’ becomes unclear. For
example, does ‘ordering’ mean any action by a capable
actor which leads to forced displacement, such as plan-
ning, instigation or incitement? If this is not the case,
then must every order constitute a strictly construed dir-
ective issued to subordinate combatants by their highest
office of military command? Do these IHL provisions,
furthermore, imply that the existence of an order is a
requisite necessity of incurring criminal responsibility
for forced displacement?
These questions and others, which are central to this
paper, are answered through the ICHL research of the El
Rosario International Law Clinic carried out for the
International Criminal Courts’ (ICCs’)—Office of Public
Council for Victims (OPCV) (Olásolo et al. 2016). Fur-
thermore, through the research of the International Law
Clinic, we establish criteria that those ‘ordering’ forced
displacement need to fulfil under ICHL.
The objective is to provide clarity for protection ac-
tors, and all stakeholders, as to who is responsible
under ICHL for the ‘ordering’ of illegal forced dis-
placement. It is also important for protection actors to
understand developments in ICHL, which increase the
obligations or rights of stakeholders, for example, in
the criminal treatment of perpetration and participa-
tion, in relation to joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and
command responsibility (Olásolo 2013; Olásolo et al.
2016; Cassese et al. 2013).
The previous paragraphs provide an introduction to
the question of ‘ordering’ forced displacement. Through
the IHL research analysis of this paper, we will show
that the issue of ordering is central to reducing civilian
vulnerability to forced displacement and illegal appro-
priation through forced displacement.Applying international humanitarian law, international
human rights law, and national law
This section introduces why IHL has been chosen as the
main vehicle of the article. An assessment will be made
in the following paragraphs of the applicability of IHRL
and national law to reducing civilian vulnerability to
forced displacement and pillage.
IHL will provide the main vehicle of this paper, as it
regulates the actions of armed parties in both inter-
national armed conflict (IAC) and non-international
armed conflict (NIAC). The levels of protection, none-
theless, that international human rights law (IHRL),
national law, and other bodies of law can provide from
forced displacement during conflict should not be dis-
missed. To the contrary, for example, if a NIAC exists
within a state but the incumbent regime refuses to
recognize an armed non-state actor (ANSA) party to the
conflict, IHRL and national law may provide the only
legal protection for civilians against forced displacement.
This article, therefore, underlines the importance of con-
sidering all applicable bodies of law which may reduce
civilian vulnerability to forced displacement (Schrepfer
2012; ICRC 2013; Jong 2015; Lane 2016).
There are numerous existing legal vehicles through
which stakeholders can encourage conflict parties to
commit to reducing civilian vulnerability, e.g. unilateral
declarations or special agreements (Mack and Pejic 2008;
Lacroix et al. 2011; Jong 2015). Numerous documents
created during conflict highlight that these legal mecha-
nisms provide parties, particularly ANSAs, with vehicles
for making contractual commitments to civilian protec-
tion (Heffes and Kotlik 2014; Sassòli 2010; Rondeau 2011).
This paper aims to provide criteria that will guide protec-
tion actors and can be adopted in contracts with conflict
parties to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced displace-
ment and HLP pillage.
With regard to IHRL and this paper, consider that a
number of provisions might be included in contracts
between parties and other stakeholders during conflict
from, e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The
aim should be to strengthen and clarify legal criteria
which protect civilian property, whether public or pri-
vate, from being illegally appropriated through displace-
ment (Lane 2016; Leckie and Huggins 2011; Golay and
Cismas 2010). Suitable provisions might include UDHR
(1948) Art 17. ‘(1) Everyone has the right to own prop-
erty alone as well as in association with others. (2) No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’. It may
be important, moreover, to include IHRL provisions
which provide protection from resource pillage, which is
often the root cause of conflict induced migration.
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both treaties for example states that ‘All peoples may, for
their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations aris-
ing out of international economic co-operation, based
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence’.
It is important to be aware, nonetheless, that many of
the IHRL provisions which can protect civilians from
forced displacement or illegal appropriation through dis-
placement, such as ICCPR [1966] Art 12. (1) and ICCPR
[1954] Art. 17. (1) can be derogated from during armed
conflict [ICCPR Art 4 1976]. Nevertheless, the advantage
of adopting IHRL provisions in special agreements
such as ceasefire or peace agreements, which may sig-
nal the end of a conflict, is that unlike IHL, IHRL re-
mains applicable once the conflict has ended (Mack
and Pejic 2008).
While the central focus of this paper is IHL, it is vital
to understand the extent to which national legal systems
can provide protection to civilians from forced displace-
ment or illegal appropriation during conflict. Research
brings to light that many states retain the right to dis-
place their citizens by force; this can be seen in the legis-
lation and military manuals of numerous countries
(Bernard et al. 2011a, b). Numerous studies highlight
that incumbent regimes often create or retain legislation
which ensures their hegemony over natural resources in
conflict with IHL or IHRL. This legislation facilitates
JCE and allows markets for illegally appropriated HLP to
develop or flourish. The reluctance or inability of incum-
bent regimes, furthermore, to legislate in protection of
HLP rights or provide secure title or tenure registration
systems exposes civilians to dispossession (Leckie and
Huggins 2011). The inability of IDPs, in addition, to
provide documentary evidence of being legally present
on HLP they inhabited, enables authorities to deny basic
rights of populations during displacement (Personal
Interview 2014a, 2014b).
It is important to recognize, nevertheless, that many
countries have engaged in the process of bringing their
jurisprudence, criminal justice systems, and judicial
proceedings in line with international law. Research
highlights that states have begun prosecuting their own
citizens as perpetrators of acts of forced displacement
under legislation in accordance with IHL (Personal
Interview 2014a, 2014b). Since 2002, the ICC has pro-
vided complementary support to numerous states to
during the alignment of their jurisprudence with the
Rome Statute (RS) (Seils 2016; Philippe 2006). Research
indicates the majority of states have provided universal
jurisdiction over international crimes within their national
courts; however, the extent to which IHL is adopted intonational law varies greatly (Amnesty 2012; Philippe
2008; IJRC 2016; ICJ 1945). Nevertheless victims, for
example, of pillage or forced displacement have the
possibility of seeking justice in another national
jurisdiction (Schrepfer 2012; Mulvey 2013; Andersen
2011; Roht-Arriaza 2001). A case in point is the judge-
ment by the District Court of Jerusalem who found
Adolf Eichmann guilty of deportation for acts of internal
displacement [Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann 1961
Criminal Case No. 40/61].
This section provides an explanation of why IHL is the
body of law chosen for this paper. How IHRL might
complement IHL in special agreements, in addition, is
introduced. Finally, the section describes some of the
issues humanitarians may encounter while attempting to
apply national law to reduce civilian vulnerability to
forced displacement and HLP pillage.
Methodology
This chapter provides an overview of the methods
employed during the research, analysis, and drafting of
this paper. The majority of the article constitutes the
result of individual research methods employed by the
author. However, the paper includes team research
carried out while the author was a member of the El
Rosario International Law Clinic; this research was
carried out through a variety of methods which are
summarized below (Olásolo et al. 2016).
Observation
This article analyses how IHL applies to a pattern of
abuse that the author of this paper has observed,
researched, and provided humanitarian protection
against in conflicts including: the Former Yugoslavia
1993–1994, Angola 1998–1999, Colombia 2014–2015,
and South Sudan 2016–2017.
Independent research
The scope and extent of HLP theft perpetrated by armed
parties through forced displacement was identified by
the author through literature review and qualitative
research methods (Personal Interview 2014a, 2014b;
Engel and Ibáñez 2007). The majority of this paper,
however, consists of a legal research analysis. Therefore,
the relevant provisions from international instruments of
IHL have been analysed, compared, and questioned in
relation to how they encompass the identified pattern of
abuse. The origins, drafting and commentaries of each
applicable article has been examined. The legal application
of these provisions, furthermore, has been examined for
consistency through the case law of the ICC and the ad
hoc tribunals. In addition, the research of numerous
scholars has been analysed and referenced on key issues
throughout the paper. Ultimately, the legal analysis of this
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identified through literature review, analysis of existing
research, and the authors’ own research.
Group research
The author was a member of the 2014 El Rosario
University International Law Clinic, which carried out
research for the ‘Office of Public Council for Victims’
(OPCV) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
the Justice and Peace Tribunal (JPT) in Bogota,
Colombia. The objective of the Clinic was to answer a
legal question posed by the OPCV and to carry out
complementary research for magistrates of the JPT. The
ICC research regards the ordering of forced displace-
ment and forms a central part of the legal analysis of this
paper. The research team systematically investigated
issues related to the ordering of forced displacement,
such as proportionality, civilian security, military necessity,
and command responsibility.
The El Rosario team was divided into groups to
carry out in-depth research into international juris-
prudence, case law, and ICHL. The research method
in general can be described as the Issue, Rule, Analysis
and Conclusion (IRAC) case study approach. Through
this method, researchers take a legal issue for consider-
ation, such as forced displacement, and consider it in a
number of different scenarios. Each research group,
thereby, analysed relevant issues systematically and drew
conclusions. The research was carried out through the
following methods:
Focus groups—Weekly focus groups were held to discuss
the research issues, which included the concepts of:
military necessity, civilian safety, proportionality,
omission, duress, joint criminal enterprise, and
command responsibility. Team members researched
relevant issues, through analysis of the case law of
the ad hoc tribunals, and the complementary legal
process in Colombia. The objective was to analyse
various contributing issues that combined would
answer the question posed by the ICC, which is the
central subject of this paper.
Combined research—Groups or pairs carried out
research into one aspect of the topic for discussion
in the coming week. If for example, your group had
military necessity, you and your partner might
research proportionality, discuss the issue with your
group, and then give a presentation to the research
team.
Individual research—The magistrates of the JPT
requested that specific research was carried out on
separate issues, and accordingly, a number of reports
were written. This research included the examination
of over 60 recent recorded cases against paramilitaryactors. The relevant reports on subjects including HLP
restitution of victims of crimes against humanity have
also been analysed in this paper.
Interviews with authorities—Weekly meetings were
held with magistrates to discuss subjects, such as
forced displacement, complementarity, HLP reparation,
transitional justice, reconciliation, and repatriation
(Personal Interview 2014a, 2014b; Olásolo et al. 2016).International humanitarian law research analysis
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are paramount in
this regard, providing in unmistakable terms for
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of those
Conventions. International crimes were no longer to
remain unpunished (Philippe 2006).
This chapter begins with a general synopsis of how
this research analysis seeks to define IHL which can
provide universal protection to civilians from forced
displacement and illegal appropriation through forced
displacement. Then, the chapter goes on to provide a
legal research analysis which progresses by delineating
and analysing sequentially the issues raised in the intro-
duction. The objective ultimately is to define IHL which
can be applied to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced
displacement and illegal appropriation or pillage through
displacement.
The first section underlines that without military en-
gagement or legitimate threats to civilian security, stake-
holders cannot consider forced displacements during
conflict to be legitimate. The following section goes
on to analyse when forced displacements can be con-
sidered as legal under the ‘exceptions’. Subsequently,
research is analysed from the El Rosario International
Law Clinic into the command responsibilities of those
‘ordering’ evacuation, the act of ordering is defined,
and criteria of a legal order of forced displacement is
provided. The chapter proceeds to clarify when forced
displacement becomes pillage or illegal appropriation.
The penultimate section addresses ambiguity regard-
ing the definition of the crime of pillage. The final
segment answers if appropriation by force from civil-
ians is prohibited without exception under IHL.Defining IHL that can provide universal protection to
civilians from forced displacement and illegal
appropriation through forced displacement
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are paramount in
this regard, providing in unmistakable terms for
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of those
Conventions. (Philippe 2006 p378).
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that may form the basis of provisions, which can provide
universal legal protection for civilians from forced dis-
placement and illegal appropriation through forced
displacement. This section outlines how some IHL
treaty’s provisions are and others become universally
binding through customary law.
The findings of this research analysis are founded on
legal sources which can provide universal protection
(Henckaerts 2010). The Geneva Conventions (GCs) of
1949 are ratified by all states are therefore universally
binding. The application in practice of the provisions of
the GCs, furthermore, can provide a powerful source of
customary law. GC IV Art 49 for example was drafted to
apply to IAC; however, it provides a customary definition
of a legal forced displacement which is applicable in
NIAC or IAC. This is because the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) created
international legal precedence by applying GC IV Art 49
to define a legal evacuation or transfer [Naletilić &
Martinović ICTY IT-98-34; ICTY 2009]. This research
analysis has examined the intention, origins, drafting,
and commentaries of each of the relevant IHL treaty
provisions which relate to forced displacement, pillage,
and illegal appropriation. Throughout this research ana-
lysis, moreover, CIHL is referenced from the relevant
case law of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. Moreover,
reference is made to the academic research of a number
of recognized legal scholars, on contentious issues such
as when appropriation by an armed party becomes illegal,
and how pillage is defined as a crime.
This section has established why the legal sources
which have been analysed in this paper where chosen.
The preceding paragraphs, furthermore, have defined
the sources of CIHL and legal scholarly research to be
referenced.
Military engagement or threats to civilian security
In the succeeding paragraphs, we will examine, when
forced displacement is clearly illegal, due to the absence
of legitimate threat to civilian security, from military en-
gagement or legitimate military operations.
Significant research carried out into the root causes of
displacement clarifies that while military engagement
may be the pretext, pillage, or illegal appropriation is
frequently the real objective of civilian displacement
(Le Bilion 2001; McGregor 2009; Reno 2009a, 2009b;
Ballintine and Nitzschke 2003 et al.; Tripathi 2005).
Extrapolation of information across numerous studies
and conflict data sources, furthermore, establishes
that pillage or illegal appropriation is a root cause of
conflict-induced migration globally (Adhikari 2013;
Engel and Ibáñez 2007; Maher 2015; ACLED 2015).
An examination of current research brings to lightthat civilian objects are being targeted through a variety of
direct or indirect displacement strategies by armed actors
and their partners. This research, furthermore, brings to
light that forced displacement is being used, in the context
of an armed conflict, to commit pillage, and not to protect
civilians from military operations (Ibid; Zapater 2010).
Research reveals that frequently, there is a complete
absence, furthermore, of actual military engagement
which might endanger civilians (Bangerter 2011; Azam
and Hoeffler 2002; Le Bilion 2001; McGregor 2009;
Reno 2009a, 2009b).
A clear example of the inapplicability of imperative
military reasons for evacuation is found in ICTY case
Prosecutor v. Krstic [IT-98-33-T para 527], furthermore,
that: ‘In this case no military threat was present following
the taking of Srebrenica. The atmosphere of terror in
which the evacuation was conducted proves, conversely,
that the transfer was carried out in furtherance of a well
organized policy whose purpose was to expel the Bosnian
Muslim population from the enclave. The evacuation was
itself the goal and neither the protection of the civilians
nor imperative military necessity justified the action’.
Following this research analysis, it is clear that under
IHL, civilian displacement cannot be ordered for reasons
related to the conflict, unless for imperative military
reasons that involve the security of civilians. While
‘imperative military reasons’ will be defined in the follow-
ing section, examination of binding sources of IHL clari-
fies that civilian displacement cannot be ordered as a
strategy of conflict [GSs 1946; ICTY IT-98-33-T et al.].
Stakeholders therefore should be aware that if it can-
not be proven that the security of civilians is threatened
through military engagement or legitimate military
operations, then any act that constitutes an order of
evacuation/forced displacement cannot be considered
legitimate.
This section has underlined that civilians and their
property are frequency the actual target of armed par-
ties. Furthermore, that all stakeholders should be aware
that under IHL civilians cannot be forcibly displaced
from their HLP, unless the circumstances of the conflict
demand and the exceptions apply.
Imperative military reasons and the security of civilians
The following section will define when the exceptions of
imperative military reasons and the security of civilians
apply. Furthermore, the aim of this segment is to dis-
prove the assumption that expert judicial investigations
are required, ex post facto, to adjudge if a forced dis-
placement/evacuation was illegal (ICTJ Research Unit
2012; Zapater 2010; Hayashi 2010; Zayas 1975).
There are established criteria in IHL, which must be
fulfilled by those ‘ordering’, if a displacement is to be
considered legal (Zayas 1975). Generally, the ICRC
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seeks to protect civilians and their property. There has
been considerable historical debate, however, in relation
to the exception of ‘imperative military reasons’. Hayashi
(2010), through a study of the commentaries of the GCs,
finds that ‘imperative military reasons’ exist only when
the presence of protected persons impedes imperative
military operations. Therefore, civilian security must be
at risk for an order of forced displacement, based on
imperative military reasons, to be legitimate. The ICRC
[1958 p278] (GC VI 1949) commentary on GC IV Art
49 states; ‘(…) evacuation may only be ordered in two
cases (…) namely when the safety of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand. If therefore an
area is in danger as a result of military operations or is
liable to be subjected to intense bombing, the Occupying
Power has the right and (…), the duty of evacuating it par-
tially or wholly, by placing the inhabitants in places of ref-
uge. The same applies when the presence of protected
persons in an area hampers military operations. Evacu-
ation is only permitted in such cases, however, when over-
riding military considerations make it imperative; if it is
not imperative, evacuation ceases to be legitimate’.
There is significant legal analysis from a number of
legal scholars on the prosecution of forced displacement
due to military necessity (Jacques 2012; Korner 2012;
Hayashi 2010; Zayas 1975). A number of these authors
highlight that legality of an evacuation order must be
based on imperative military reasons and must be
assessed in the light of the knowledge available to the
military commander ‘at that time’. This is irrespective of
the fact that a subsequent examination may show an
absence of imperative military reasons. Zayas (1975,
p219) infers from the trials of General Lother Rendulic
and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein that legal displace-
ment refers to ‘Situations where army commanders judge
that the safety of the civilian population requires that they
be removed from the battle zone and not when the same
army commander decides that military advantage would
be gained by removing the population and scorching the
earth behind them’. The legality of carrying out an evacu-
ation due to military necessity is based on the information
available at that time to those ordering. The examination
of that information by the judiciary has become known as
the ‘Rendulic test’ [Prosecutor v.Prosecutor v. KrsticIT-98-
33-T para 526] (Merriam 2016).
Further analysis of the General Lothar Rendulics’ trial
highlights, however, that his acquittal for a scorched
earth policy in Finmark, Norway, is based on the
exception of military necessity based on the Hague
Regulations (HR) [1907] Convention IV Art 23 (g): ‘To
destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such de-
struction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war’ [“Opinion and Judgment of MilitaryTribunal V,” United States v. Wilhelm List, et al. 1948
p1296]. There has been significant progression in IHL
on military necessity since the drafting of the HRs aimed
at protecting civilians from scorched earth policies,
which can be seen in AP I (1977) Art 54, for example.
Therefore, from a purely humanitarian perspective, we
can assume that the evacuation that Rendulic ‘ordered’
would be considered illegal today, due to the destruction
of civilian objects required by civilians to survive, and the
illegal civilian displacement. The Tribunal, moreover,
premised the logic of its acquittal based on the informa-
tion available to them which supported that Rendulic was
correct in his assumption that an armed opponent might
sustain themselves on available civilian objects [ibid].
The ICRCs’ [Henckaert & Doswald-Beck 2015] study
of CIHL holds that parties to a conflict must avoid any
act of displacement caused by their own acts, particu-
larly those caused by acts contrary to IHL. The ICRC
[2005] CIHL study and RS Art. 7. 2. (d), further, forbids
the use of coercive acts, direct, and indirect means,
which may cause the displacement. GC IV Art. 49,
nevertheless, is often referred to as the ‘exception’, as it
allows for the evacuation of the population if imperative
military reasons so demand. Considered in conjunction,
AP I (1977) Arts 58(a) and (c), and GC IV Art 49, how-
ever, impose a duty on military commanders to evacuate
civilians from the vicinity of military objectives that en-
danger the security of civilians (Jacques 2012). The ICRC
[1987 p1471] commentary on AP I (1977) Art 17, further-
more, states that ‘The situation should be scrutinized most
carefully as the adjective ‘imperative’ reduces to a mini-
mum cases in which displacement may be ordered’.
Therefore, we must conclude that only those specific civil-
ians who will be endangered by imperative military opera-
tions can be legitimately displaced.
Legal scholars concur that evacuation has a protective
element which is absent from all forms of illegal dis-
placement. The research of these scholars underlines
that if evacuations/forced displacements do not fulfil
adequate standards of civilian protection, then they must
be seen as illegal (Jacques 2012; Zayas 1975). Further,
based on an analysis of IHL treaty provisions and CIHL
and in relation to the objective of this paper, an evacu-
ation/forced displacement must therefore be considered
illegal if ‘(…) satisfactory conditions (…)’ are not pro-
vided for the security of civilians by the armed party
responsible. In addition, transfer, evacuation, or forced
displacement can be considered illegal, if the protecting
power (if designated) is not informed that an evacuation is
taking place. Suggesting the existence of an obligation, on
those responsible for ordering, to have an organized plan
of evacuation/forced displacement and to provide that
plan to a third party (e.g. the protecting power) concerned
with the protection of civilians. Obviously, the need for
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a plan may be shared; nevertheless, this does not diminish
the obligations of, e.g. GCIV Art 49, AP II (1977) 17, and
AP I (1977) 58.
This segment of the research analysis has defined
when the exceptions of imperative military reasons and
civilian security apply. In addition, the section has identi-
fied that stakeholders can establish if forced displacements
are illegal if adequate standards of civilian protection are
not fulfilled by those responsible for ‘ordering’.
‘Ordering’, who is responsible for illegal forced
displacement?
The following section examines the research of the El
Rosario International Law Clinic into the ordering of
forced displacement. Subsequently, the research analysis
will examine the extent to which those in a position to
‘order’ are responsible for forced displacement.
Significantly, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
began seeking their first ever conviction of illegal forced
displacement in 2014, in the Bosco Ntaganda case. Dur-
ing, Pre-Trial Chamber II, the defence appealed against
the decision confirming the charges: ‘In the opinion of
the Defence, the Elements of Crimes “are clear and un-
ambiguous” in the sense that an order is required by the
perpetrator of the crime’. The defence, thereby, alleging
that the ICC had erroneously confirmed the charge of
forced displacement ‘(…) in the absence of any order by
the suspect to displace the civilian population’ [ICC-01/
04-02/06 para 31]. The defence, thereby, claimed that
Mr Ntaganda could not be held responsible for unlawful
displacement, as it could not be established that he had
given the order. The prosecution challenged, subse-
quently, if it was necessary to prove that an order had
been given for criminal responsibility to attach. The
appeal, however, was rejected, on the grounds that the
defence where merely expressing an opinion on a matter
sub judice [ICC-01/04-02/06 para 31]. It raised an im-
portant question, nonetheless, one that may influence
the case, the prosecution of forced displacement, and
Humanitarian Action [ICC-01/04-02/06].
The question under debate asks if RS Art 8(2)(e)(viii)
requires that the Prosecutor of ICC must prove that a
specific order was given by the accused that led to illegal
forced displacement. The following excerpt from the
pre-trial chamber shows that evidence could be provided
that Mr Ntaganda had played a role in inciting violations
that included displacement and pillage. The issue for
debate, however, is if it is necessary to prove that an actual
direct order had been given to establish guilt. The follow-
ing excerpt shows Mr Ntaganda in his capacity within the
Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)/Patriotic Forces for
the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), inciting and giving
instructions that call for forced displacement, pillage, andother violations to be committed. If a direct order was
given, and who was responsible for the overall strategy, is
however, unclear:
Mr. Ntaganda, in his official capacity within the UPC/
FPLC, regularly raised awareness among the troops
and Hema civilians, in person or by radio, of the need
to exterminate the Lendu and chase them away from
the territory under the control of the UPC/FPLC,
regardless of whether they were taking part in
hostilities or not. The evidence further shows that
when addressing UPC/FPLC troops at a military
parade in Mabanga, in November 2002, Mr. Ntaganda
used the expression “piga na kuchaji” or “kupiga na
kuchaji”, which meant that troops should fight and
pillage everything, including “women”. Another
high-ranking official, Commander Salumu Mulenda
(“Mr. Mulenda”), also employed this expression at a
UPC/FPLC meeting in Lalo village, in preparation for
the attack on Mongbwalu on or about 20 November
2002. The evidence further indicates that before
attacking the town on or about 6 May 2003, the
UPC/FPLC instructed the Hema civilian population
to leave Bunia, as all remaining people would be
considered to be the enemy [ICC-01/04-02/06].
The question under debate concerns humanitarians in a
number of ways: firstly, when we consider stakeholder re-
sponsibility for, or complicity in, illegal forced displacement
or dispossession through forced displacement; secondly,
how we address the issue of forced displacement, and illegal
appropriation through forced displacement as humanitar-
ians; and finally, in establishing who has responsibility for
carrying out a legal forced displacement or evacuation.
The El Rosario University International Law Clinic
was asked to investigate the following question and a
number of related questions by the ‘Office of Public
Council for Victims’ (OPCV) of the ICC:
Regarding the chamber’s rejection of the request for
leave to appeal filed by the Defence in the Ntaganda
case against the decision confirming the charges, does
article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Rome Statute require the
Prosecutor to prove that a specific order was given by
the perpetrator for the unlawful displacement of the
civilian population? (…)
The provision in question is important for protection
actors attempting to reduce civilian vulnerability to
forced displacement and can be found in three sources
of binding international law: (i) AP II (1977) Art 17;
(ii) RS Art 8(2)(e)(viii); and (iii) ICRCs study on CIHL
Rule 129 (B). All three sources contain the following
provision:
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for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security
of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons
so demand.
An initial study of legal theory and international
law by the research team found that if the intention
is to displace is unlawfully acted upon criminal lia-
bility immediately attaches. In this case, the intention
is enacted through an ‘order’. Therefore, under RS
Art 8(2)(e)(viii), an order whether the displacement is
carried out or not constitutes a punishable prepara-
tory act.
The International Law Clinic team, however, highlighted
a number of subjective elements we should consider in
relation to the ordering of forced displacement and in
establishing who is responsible for ensuring that illegal
forced displacement does not take place. The ICC has no
case law on forced displacement or on the punishable
preparatory act of ordering. Therefore, the investiga-
tion team construed its objective and subjective elements
in light of criminal justice notions (i) punishable pre-
paratory acts; (ii) ‘ordering’ as mode of individual
criminal liability; (iii) effective control and command
responsibility; and (iv) indirect perpetration as an orga-
nized structure of power. The team also analysed the
concept of military necessity under Hague and Geneva
Law (Olásolo et al. 2016).
The investigation highlights that the intention of the
provision is to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced dis-
placement during conflict. Responsibility cannot, there-
fore, be evaded by adopting indirect methods whose
objective is achieved in the absence of a definitive
‘order’. The investigation finds a number of authors
interpret the provision in this way (Willms 2009). This
interpretation is further strengthened by the preparatory
works of AP II (1977) in which the expression ‘forcible
displacement’ is used to include both indirect and direct
methods of committing the crime.
The El Rosario Clinics’ review of UN resolutions and
sources of CIHL such as Rule 129 (B) of the ICRC
[2005] CIHL study further establishes this position. The
obligation, moreover, is underlined on parties to avoid
causing displacement, e.g. through indiscriminate attacks.
Those in a position of ordering, therefore, are responsible
for conflict induced displacement whether it is intentional
or not (Olásolo et al. 2016).
The preceding paragraphs have, by examining the re-
search of the El Rosario International Law Clinic, found
that those in a position to order are responsible for
forced displacements. Furthermore, that those in a pos-
ition to order are responsible whether direct or indirect
methods are deliberately employed or if the forced
displacement of civilians was intentional or not.Defining the act of ‘ordering’ forced displacement
The following section continues the examination of the
El Rosario International Law Clinics research with the
objective of delineating the concept of ordering under
IHL. Consequentially, the research of the El Rosario
Clinic provides the criteria which an order of forced
displacement/evacuation would need to fulfil to be con-
sidered legal.
The El Rosario International Law Clinic found two
established positions regarding the definition of ordering
as a criminal act. One position based on the broad
intention of AP II (1977) Art. 17 found that; ‘(…) “order-
ing” should be interpreted as any voluntary action that
causes the displacement’ (Willms 2009 p558-559). Con-
sequentially parties are responsible for acts which dir-
ectly, or indirectly, cause the displacement of the civilian
population. The second position based on the drafting
process of the RS Article in question maintains that
“ordering” is a preparatory act prohibited in itself and
that other acts, such as instigating, may not be con-
sidered orders. Accordingly, under this position
liability would only attach in the issuance of an order,
regardless of whether the order leads to civilian dis-
placement or not (Dörmann 2003 p431-407; Olásolo
et al. 2016 p70-71).
The origin of RS Art 8(2) (e) (viii), however, can be
traced back to AP II (1977) Art 17 and GC IV Art. 49
which indicate that direct and indirect acts which cause,
or may cause displacement, are prohibited [ICRC 2005].
Conversely, the ICC statute definitions of individual
criminal responsibility in RS Art 25 3 (a) and (b) sug-
gests that, for the order to be a crime, forced displace-
ment must at least be attempted. The order itself,
therefore, may not be considered an independent crime,
in that the criminal act ordered must take place or be
attempted for liability to attach (Olásolo et al. 2016).
The El Rosario Clinic, however, found that this con-
tradicted the fact that the provision itself must be
interpreted strictly as RS Art 22 (2) states: ‘The defin-
ition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall
not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person
being investigated, prosecuted, or convicted’. Further-
more, acknowledging the drafting of the RS, the
omission of an order preventing forced displacement
by superiors may be a crime in itself, and ‘ordering
the displacement of the civilian population’ is specific
in the provision.
Further analysis, by the International Law Clinic,
brings to light that, ‘ordering’ if considered as a punish-
able preparatory act, must be consistent with other
preparatory acts. The first, ‘punishable preparatory act’,
which is contained in RS Art 25(3) (e), regards genocide
and states: ‘In respect of the crime of genocide, directly
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more, the crime lay ‘in (…) the instigator’s intent to cause
the required state of mind in a third party’. Cassese et al.
(2013) holds that any preparatory act of ordering, that
may lead to a crime provided for under the ICC Statute, is
prohibited (Olásolo et al. 2016).
Subsequent to a further analysis of jurisprudence, and
case law, the El Rosario Clinic found, the following
elements constitute the war crime of ‘ordering the
displacement of civilians’ in the Ntaganda case:
a. The person ordered a displacement of a civilian
population.
b. Involved civilians’ security or military necessity did
not justify the order.
c. The person was in a position to effect displacement
by giving an order.
d. The conduct took place in the context of and was
associated with an armed, non-international conflict.
e. The person was aware of the factual circumstances
surrounding the armed conflict (Ibid p77-78).
Here, requirement b. diverges somewhat from the
findings of this research analysis which suggests that
stakeholders might exclude military necessity as an ex-
ception unless it involves civilian security (Hayashi
2010). In relation to ‘ordering’ and requirement c. ‘the
person was in a position to effect displacement by giving
an order’, there are a number of subjective and objective
elements that the International Law Clinic [2014]
considered in its definition of ‘ordering’ including:
Besides the primary order, there may be a chain of
orders and several levels of command.
Those responsible, e.g. may order a small or large force,
be a military commander, a politician, or a business
executive.
That command responsibility is inherent in ordering.
The organization that receives the order can carry it out.
Those that receive the order must have the
authority to transmit it and/or the potential
material perpetrators of the capacity to carry
out the crime.
That there is sufficient hierarchical structure and
fungibility that the order leads to action.
Planning to displace through issuing of instructions
constitutes an order.
A person is aware of the substantial likelihood of
displacement through their order.
The elements of crimes require that the person be
in a position to effect such displacement by giving
an order.
An omission in preventing an act, or the carrying out
of an order, amounts to an order.The research of the El Rosario International Law
Clinic found the ICTY had established a position in
CIHL through its definition of the provisions of GC IV
Art. 49.
Finally, the International Law Clinic, after a compre-
hensive comparative study of legal theory, international
Jurisprudence, and case law, found that ‘a superior who
issues a displacement order to incur criminal liability, it
is necessary that such an order:
(i.) is issued in breach of the procedure established in
Article 49 of GC VI [1949];
(ii.) does not state the temporal nature of the
displacement; or
(iii.) is not followed by the return of the displaced
civilian population to their homeland, once the
circumstances that justified its displacement have
disappeared’ [Olásolo et al. 2016 p87].
This segment, which provides an examination of the
research of the El Rosario International Law Clinic, has
delineated the concept of ordering. In addition, this
section through the research of the El Rosario Clinic
has established the criteria of a legal order of forced
displacement or evacuation.
When forced displacement becomes pillage
The following part of this research analysis aims to
define under IHL when forced displacement becomes
pillage or illegal appropriation. The aim is to provide cri-
teria that stakeholders can apply to establish if through
forced displacement, pillage, or illegal appropriation has
been committed.
IHL requires that the party responsible for an evic-
tion/legal forced displacement facilitates the voluntary
return of the population to the location from where they
were displaced, i.e. ‘Persons thus evacuated shall be
transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in
the area in question have ceased’ [GC IV Art 49 1949].
As this study has shown, through an examination of IHL
treaties, and CIHL, an evacuation or legal displacement
must be temporary and during the displacement the
responsible party must make adequate provision for the
welfare of the civilians. Without these conditions being
fulfilled, therefore, an illegal act of transfer or forced
displacement has taken place.
The motive of the forced displacement can be
assessed, subsequently, in the unwillingness of parties to
facilitate return. This paper proposes that once hostilities
in an area which can endanger civilians have ceased, the
responsible parties must facilitate return within a desig-
nated timeframe. Consequentially, therefore, if they do
not facilitate return within the established timeframe,
the responsible party would automatically be liable for
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The significance is that the timeframe places an obliga-
tion on the parties of the conflict to facilitate return. As
a consequence, the difficult issue can be avoided of
establishing if the displacement was legal, i.e. carried out
due to military necessity for the security the civilian
population (Zayas 1975).
Therefore, an illegal forced displacement has taken
place: If the parties to a conflict do not facilitate volun-
tary return, within a specific timeframe, and once civilian
security is not effected by military engagement between
parties.
Logically, therefore, if conflict parties continue to con-
trol an area and do not facilitate return, profit from, or
occupy the HLP of the civilians, then the property has
been illegally appropriated, i.e. pillaged.
Therefore, in legal terms, stakeholders can establish
when an act of unlawful displacement should include an
additional charge of pillage, if they can establish the
following;
a.) An indication that a criminal act of illegal
dispossession and or pillage has occurred:
(i.) Is either in the failure to facilitate voluntary
return, by the responsible party; or
(ii.) Omission of legal ordering that facilitates
displacement (evacuation) and return.
b.) That an act of displacement might be considered
pillage if both the following criteria are fulfilled:
(i.) Return is not facilitated; and
(ii.) If the parties possess and or profit from the HLP,
from where civilians were displaced (Parties here
being the internationally recognized parties in an
armed conflict).
This section has completed the central objective of
this paper which was to delineate IHL which can be
applied to reduce civilian vulnerability to forced dis-
placement and illegal appropriation through forced dis-
placement. The section does not, however, define the
scope of pillage as a crime or answer if forced displace-
ment employed to dispossess can be considered pillage.
Defining the crime of pillage
The following section hopes to provide an accurate con-
temporary definition of the crime of pillage. Moreover,
this penultimate part of the research analysis seeks to
establish if HLP dispossession through forced displace-
ment can be recognized as pillage. The section asks if
civilian vulnerability can be reduced if illegal appro-
priation through forced displacement is recognized as
pillage.
There has been renewed international interest in the
crime of pillage, as a universal way to deter the illegalappropriation of civilian property, either public or pri-
vate. A number of legal scholars argue for the reesta-
blishment and simplification of the legal framework for
the prosecution of pillage (Stewart 2011; Keenan 2014;
Herik and Jong 2011). These scholars argue based on
international jurisprudence, and the case law of the ad
hoc international tribunals, that a simplified framework
would allow the diverse forms of property theft to be
prosecuted under one crime, pillage. Thereby, forced
displacement employed to illegally appropriate civilian
HLP would be prosecuted as pillage.
Numerous studies highlight the variety of HLP theft to
which pillage applies to at macro, mezzo, and micro
levels (Bangerter 2011; Maher 2015; Le Bilion 2001;
McGregor 2009; Reno 2009a, 2009b; Kalyvas 2000; Engel
and Ibáñez 2007). This is evident in natural resources
pillage by corporate actors, usurpation of land by armed
parties, and the theft of personal household items by
individual combatants [ICC-01/04-02/06 p24; Prosecutor
v. Brdanin 2004; The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay
Taylor 2012]. A number of authors have highlighted
that historically pillage by business has a long and clearly
defined application under CIHL (Stewart 2011). At Nur-
emberg, for example, those prosecuted as war criminals
included businessmen who engaged in natural resource
pillage. Their crimes included the illegal appropriation of
coal, oil, and precious metals from occupied territories
such as France, Poland, and Russia. Those who were
indirectly involved, furthermore, such as shareholders of
banks that dealt in pillaged goods, were also prosecuted
as war criminals [IMT I945-46].
Examination confirms that pillage is included as a
crime in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and other
international courts, often under the synonyms of plun-
der, looting, and spoliation. It is generally accepted,
nonetheless, that these terms are synonymous legally.
Moreover, it is widely considered that they all relate to a
wide definition of the varieties and forms of civilian
property theft (Bing Bing 2002; Stewart 2011; Keenan
2014). The UN ICTY [2009], significantly, simply defined
pillage as ‘embracing all forms of unlawful appropriation
of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal
responsibility attaches under international law.’ The
Statute of the UN ICTY [2009] maintains individual
criminal responsibility under CIHL, to be defined as
‘A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
or execution of a crime (…)’. The ICRC (2006) Business
and International Humanitarian Law guidance document
highlights the criminal responsibility of all those involved
in pillage through forced displacement. Previous research
by various authors has found that pillage is aligned with
theft in the domestic law of most countries (Herik and
Jong 2011 et al.). Pillage has been recognized as a crime in
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prohibited pillage or sacking under the penalty of death
(Stewart 2011).
This analysis of IHL provisions, and CIHL, shows
pillage is universally prohibited in IAC, and NIAC
[HR 1907; GC 1949; Rome Statute 2002]. The ICRC
CIHL Study Volume 1 Rule 52 underlines that ‘State
practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary
international law applicable in both IAC and NIAC’.
The universal prohibition of pillage is further confirmed
through examination of GC IV Art 33 applicable in IAC
and AP II (1977) Art 4(2) (g), applicable in NIAC.
In addition, ‘pillaging a town or place, even when taken
by assault’ is prohibited through the provisions RS Art 8
War crimes2. (b) (xvi) applicable in IAC, and under RS
Art 8.2(e) (v) applicable in NIAC. A number of authors
bring to light that the reference to a ‘town or a place’ is
not in line with IHL, and further, the prohibition of pil-
lage is universal (Stewart 2011; Keenan 2014). Further-
more, AP II (1977) Art 4 g) underlines that ‘pillage is
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever’. In
relation to CIHL, the ICC in Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga [2014] found ‘In the opinion of the Chamber,
the pillaging of a town or place comprises all forms of
appropriation, public or private, including not only
organized and systematic appropriation, but also acts of
appropriation committed by combatants in their own
interest’ [ICC-01/04-01/07- 3436 para 905].
Pillage through displacement can be established as a
widespread and systematic policy, which directly targets
civilians and civilian property. An examination of the
case law of the JPT, ICTY, IMT, SCSL, and the ICC will
dispel any assumption that forced displacement is simply
an unavoidable consequence of military engagement
[Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda ICC-01/04-02/06; The
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL-03-01-A;
Prosecutor v. Brdanin IT-99-36-T; Prosecutor v. Radovan
Karadžić IT-95-5/18-T para 2539]. It becomes increas-
ingly clear, furthermore, that forced displacement is
employed to commit pillage. Furthermore, as a review of
state military manuals and ANSA combat codes, from
numerous countries including, DRC, CAR, China,
Philippines, and Colombia, can confirm, pillaging civilian
property is generally prohibited by armed parties them-
selves (Bernard et al. 2011a, b).
This research analysis suggests that IHL prohibits the
appropriation of civilian property by force by state or
ASNAs. The majority of states, however, have attempted
to reserve the right to appropriate civilian property
through forced displacement, and this can be seen in
state military manuals (ibid). It is important to acknow-
ledge, furthermore, that as it appears under CIHL,
parties to a conflict may, in certain circumstances, lawfully
subject civilian property to military requirements, e.g.requisition for the needs of the army of occupation [ICRC
Rule 51 2005].
Through this section, we have defined the crime of
pillage. The finding is that pillage as a crime applies to
any form of illegal appropriation of civilian property dur-
ing conflict. Therefore, forced displacement employed to
illegally appropriate civilian HLP during conflict may be
considered pillage. Through this analysis, moreover, we
can say that IHL, through pillage, provides considerable
protection from dispossession through displacement.Pillage prohibiting appropriation of civilian property by
force
This final section examines pillage in relation to the
prohibition of appropriating civilian property by force,
under IHL. The final paragraphs of this research analysis
aim to establish that appropriation of civilian property
by force is categorically prohibited under IHL.
According to the following statement from the non-
binding ICC Elements of Crimes: ‘As indicated by the use
of the term “private or personal use”, appropriations
justified by military necessity cannot constitute the
crime of pillaging’ ICC [2010]. Significantly, a number of
authors have examined the phrase ‘personal or private
use’. These authors find its use to be contradictory to,
and not in line with, the rules of war, historical prece-
dence, or current legal thought (Herik and Jong 2011;
Stewart 2011). Stewart (2011 p20) found that ‘(…) mili-
tary necessity cannot act as an independent and separate
justification for pillage, as military necessity cannot act
as a justification for a violation unless the term “military
necessity” is explicitly listed as an exception to the rule
in question. This is not the case for pillage, which is
prohibited in absolute terms’. This is confirmed by GC
IV Art 33, AP II (1977) Art 4 g), and RS Arts 8 2 (e) (v),
and 8 2 (b) (xvi), none of which provide accommodation
for ‘pillage’ due to military necessity. Significantly, under
IHL treaties, there is no allowance for appropriation of
civilian property by illegal force, i.e. pillage.
There seems to be, however, some accommodation
made for appropriation of civilian property, due to mili-
tary necessity under CIHL. ICRC CIHL Study Rule 51
allows for the appropriation of public property subject
to the laws of usufruct and prohibits the confiscation of
private property unless it is due to imperative military
necessity. RS Art 8 2 (a) (iv) provides some allowance
for requisition, due to military necessity. Even so it must
be legal, as the provision prohibits the extensive, unlaw-
ful, or wanton appropriation of civilian property. A
number of authors, conversely, maintain that appropri-
ation by force can take place, but it cannot amount to
resources of a ‘sufficient monetary value’, that would cause
grave consequences for civilians (Stewart 2011).
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that this perspective fails to distinguish between CIHL
and IHL treaties. As IHL treaties definitively prohibit
appropriation of civilian property through illegal force,
through the prohibition of pillage in GC IV Art 33, AP
II (1977) Art 4 g), and also RS Art 8 2 (e) (v) and 8 2 (b)
(xvi). In addition, the only allowance for legal appropri-
ation of civilian property is found in RS Art 8 2 (a) (iv).
This analysis has shown that allowances in CIHL for
appropriation of civilian property due to imperative mili-
tary necessity are extremely specific and do not, in any
circumstances, justify pillage. We can maintain therefore
that under IHL, pillage, or the appropriation of civilian
property by illegal force is categorically prohibited.
The final passages of this research analysis highlight
that legal appropriation of civilian property, whether
through forced displacement any other act is categoric-
ally prohibited under IHL. Highlighting that through this
research analysis, it has been established that there are
no exceptions which enable parties to employ forced
displacement to dispossess civilians of their HLP.
Legal research analysis findings
Forced displacement can be considered unjustifiable,
illegitimate, and illegal, under IHL if:
i.) It cannot be proven, that the security of civilians is
threatened, i.e. due to pending or actual military
engagement
ii.) If a plan for return is not apparent and voluntary
return is not facilitated (immediately once hostilities
have ceased in the specific area in question)
iii.) If there is a breach of the procedure established in
Article 49 of GC VI [1949]
iv.) If the protecting power (if one has been appointed)
has not been informed that an evacuation is taking
place
Pillage will be considered to have taken place if both:
i.) Voluntary return is not facilitated (e.g. immediately
or within three months)
ii.) If parties possess and or profit from the HLP from
where the civilians were displaced
Conclusion
In the context of displacement, it is vitally important
for those who decide to return that there is a clear,
unambiguous, and accessible written record available
of what occurred, in the event that there is resistance
to the return by those who were responsible for, or
acquiesced in, or have benefited from the
displacement (Korner 2012 p13).The findings of this paper show that under IHL treat-
ies, pillage is categorically and universally prohibited and
can be considered to have taken place if civilian property
is appropriated by illegal force through illegal forced
displacement.
Regarding the point at which forced displacement
becomes pillage, the time factor is significant in the find-
ings. There is, for example, allowance for forced dis-
placement due to civilian security or military necessity.
Therefore, time to establish that a particular forced
displacement is illegal is required. Nonetheless, if dis-
possession is the obvious intention, and the forced
displacement is clearly illegal, then immediately estab-
lishing pillage may be possible. What if the crime is
carried out extemporaneously, however, and the
forced displacement was not obviously illegal? Conse-
quentially, therefore, establishing the exact point at
which displacement becomes pillage should be done
from the moment at which military engagement that
affects the security of civilians has ended. The first
element is if voluntary return is not facilitated within
a reasonable timescale contingent on the time re-
quired for return (e.g. 3 months). Thereafter, if parties
occupy or profit from the HLP required by the civil-
ians to survive or remain at origin, pillage can be
considered to have taken place.
This paper has established a number of difficulties
in addressing illegal forced displacement and pillage
through displacement. Further, the findings provide
guidelines based on IHL, which might enable com-
mon ground to be established between stakeholders.
The risks involved for humanitarians, civilians, and
other stakeholders engaging armed actors on such
contentious issues cannot be overstated. Any proposed
action, therefore, should be accompanied by complexity
analysis or other contextual risk assessment method. This
study suggests that there is, nevertheless, considerable
protective value in stakeholders being facilitated with
guidelines on illegal forced displacement and when it
becomes pillage or illegal appropriation. Numerous frame-
works and guidelines on forced displacement were
reviewed during the research for this study, and none
address the issues raised in this paper. Therefore, the
following recommendations are aimed at humanitarian
organizations and other stakeholders seeking to reduce
civilian vulnerability illegal forced displacement and to
dispossession through displacement.
Recommendations
This paper advocates four key activities:
1. Application of provisions based on the findings of
this paper in binding agreements with armed parties:
Provisions based on the findings of this paper might
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IAC or ceasefire agreements in NIAC. This research
analysis underlines that parties to NIAC are obliged
through GC Common Article 3 to enter into special
agreements and by CIHL to adhere to the criteria
contained in GC IV Art 49. The work of the ICRC
and Geneva Call suggests that the inclusion of
relevant provisions in agreement documents provide
a binding form of legal protection, which can
immediately reduce civilian vulnerability to specific
violations (Lacroix et al. 2011; Ruaudel 2013).
Common agreement documents for application by
stakeholders might be drafted, which are specific to
or give particular attention to forced displacement
and illegal appropriation through displacement
(Mack and Pejic 2008). These documents might
include, for example, a deed of commitment on
forced displacement and HLP pillage (Personal
Interview 2016). Recommended activities might
include
(a) identifying the root causes and patterns of
displacement through contextually relevant research;
(b) establishing key stakeholder relations identifying
their needs, motives, and objectives; (c) continuous
contextual risk analysis, including assessment of
existing armed actor engagement, and threat to
civilians or humanitarian staff; (d) stakeholder
training in IHL/IHRL and the creation of unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral agreements; (e) the
creation and adoption of special agreements with
armed parties and key stakeholders; and (f ) the
establishment of monitoring, reporting, verification,
and enforcement mechanisms.
2. Dissemination of IHL guidelines on forced
displacement and illegal appropriation through
forced displacement to key stakeholder groups:
Contemporary research and the issues which this
paper raises suggest that the humanitarian approach
to forced displacement needs to be revaluated. The
issues raised in this paper, if disseminated widely,
may contribute to an improved approach to
reducing civilian vulnerability to forced
displacement. The existing guidebooks or manuals
on forced displacement inadequately address the
issues raised in this paper. The majority of
publications on forced displacement from agencies
such as the ICRC, UNHCR, IASC, and NRC, are
concerned with the protection of IDPs, and refugees,
post displacement. These publications and normative
frameworks, in addition, contain numerous issues
which constitute gaps for protection actors
attempting to reduce vulnerability to the act of
forced displacement. In the Handbook for the
Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (PCWG2007), for example, we see the following question: ‘Is
forcible displacement an offence that is prosecuted
and are all actors aware that arbitrary displacement
is unlawful?’ This question contradicts itself as
forcible displacement is not always an offence, as the
phrase then implies by indicating that only arbitrary
displacement is unlawful. Normative frameworks,
furthermore, while providing important legal
protection to IDPs and refugees, provide little
assistance to protection actors trying to reduce
vulnerability to forced displacement or HLP pillage
through forced displacement. The Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement principle 6 (1) and the
Pinheiro Principles 5 (1) use the term ‘(…) right to
be protected against being arbitrarily displaced’
without a clear explanation that indicates ‘arbitrary’
here implies when the exceptions of military
necessity or civilian security are inapplicable. The
principle objective of the recommended IHL
guidelines would be to clarify in simple terms, for all
stakeholders, when forced displacement is illegal and
when forced displacement becomes illegal
appropriation. The guidelines might contain, for
example, a chapter aimed at armed parties including
a section on the responsibility to evacuate civilians
whose security is compromised by imperative
military operations. In addition, include a section to
provide instruction on how to carry out a legal
evacuation/forced displacement (i.e. to agree host
community support for IDPs, facilitate return, and
to respect civilian objects). The guidelines,
furthermore, should give clear instruction on
‘ordering’ and clarify who is responsible if forced
displacements do take place.
3. Fast tracking of pre-emptive HLP registration
processes in vulnerable ‘at risk’ of displacement
communities: The fast tracking of HLP registration
might be achieved through formal or customary
registration systems, community participatory
mapping, or other contextually relevant methods
(Unruh 2014). A standard HLP registration docu-
ment might be developed for communities ‘at risk’
of displacement. These documents might be stored
individually, for example, online. Research suggests
that without evidence of ownership or
occupancy it is difficult to protect HLP from being
illegally appropriated through forced displacement.
Consider an individual IDP, for example, attempting
to establish the right to return, dispute the illegal oc-
cupancy of their home post-conflict, or simply pro-
vide evidence that they have been displaced from
HLP where they were legally present. If customary
HLP practices are dominated by criminal, patriarchal,
or ethno-centric power structures then informal
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of legal presence. HLP mapping, however, can be a
formidable undertaking especially in conflict contexts,
where at-risk communities may have limited
education and live in impoverished conditions.
Nevertheless, the value of micro-level registration
is that armed parties may be deterred from displacing
civilians from HLP and they may have difficulty
retaining or trading. HLP registration systems,
furthermore, have their own significant protective
capacity.
4. The development of Humanitarian Protection
strategy with a focus on forced displacement and
HLP pillage: This paper does not concern the
design of humanitarian protection strategy to
address forced displacement or HLP pillage.
Furthermore, the research for this paper has
established that, beyond engaging armed parties on
their obligations under IHL, humanitarian
experience in protecting civilians from illegal
forced displacement or HLP pillage is limited
(Zapater 2010). Therefore, this paper is appealing
to protection specialists and humanitarian
academics to research and develop humanitarian
protection strategy on forced displacement which
may be applied in the field. The research for this
article suggests that protection practitioners may
consider incorporating the following actions in
humanitarian protection strategies on forced
displacement and illegal appropriation through
forced displacement:
(a) continuous contextual risk analysis with
particular focus on stakeholder motives needs and
objectives and increasing engagement with armed
actors; (b) identify or carry out contextually
relevant research or data collection to identify root
causes and factors which deter forced displacement
and HLP pillage; (c) conduct community
protection meetings and mapping to identify
community coping mechanisms, risk areas, local
protection structures, and to reinforce deterrence
factors; (d) facilitate HLP registration through
formal systems or informal methods to provide
documentary evidence of legal presence on HLP;
and (e) engage with armed parties and other
stakeholders on community protection issues,
provide training in IHL, and facilitate the creation
of agreement documents on forced displacement
and HLP pillage.
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